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Future European Parliament Elections: 
Ten Steps Towards Uniform Procedures  
by Kai-Friederike Oelbermann and Friedrich Pukelsheim 
Ten procedural steps for the European Parliament elections are proposed so as to 
achieve more uniformity among the national electoral provisions of the 27 Member 
States. The steps include the creation of a European Electoral Authority, the enhancement 
of the European party system, and the consolidation of the many diverse seat apportion-
ment methods into the single divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-
Laguë). The introduction of semi-open list systems is addressed, as is the formation of a 
single European constituency for the election of an additional 25 MEPs. In the long run, 
the translation of votes into seats could be carried out using the biproportional variant of 
the divisor method with standard rounding, in order to better mirror the structure of the 
European Union. 
Zehn Verfahrensschritte für die Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament werden vorge-
schlagen, um die in den 27 Mitgliedstaaten geltenden nationalen Regelungen weiter zu 
vereinheitlichen. Die Schritte umfassen die Schaffung einer europäischen Wahlbehörde, 
die Stärkung des europäischen Parteiensystems und die Beschränkung der vielen unter-
schiedlichen Sitzzuteilungsmethoden auf eine einheitliche: das Divisorverfahren mit 
Standardrundung (Webster/Sainte-Laguë). Die Einführung eines Wahlsystems mit halbof-
fenen Listen wird ebenso diskutiert wie die Bildung eines europaweiten Wahlkreises für 
die Besetzung von 25 zusätzlichen Sitzen. Langfristig könnte eine europaweite Umrech-
nung von Stimmen in Sitze über die doppeltproportionale Variante des Divisorverfahrens 
mit Standardrundung vollzogen werden, um die Struktur der Europäischen Union besser 
abzubilden. 
I. Introduction 
Assessing the post-war European integration process, Wirsching illuminates the 
contraposition of Wille und Vorstellung.1 The antagonisms that went along with 
the process are reflected by the enigmatic character of the European Parliament 
(EP) and its predecessor, the Common Assembly. Among the institutions of the 
European Union, the EP is the one veering most between Sein und Schein. With 
 
1  Wirsching, A.: Europa als Wille und Vorstellung – Die Geschichte der europäischen Integration zwi-
schen nationalem Interesse und großer Erzählung, in: ZSE, 4 (2006), 488–506. 
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a view towards the poor coverage of European issues in the campaign for the 
2009 EP elections and the low voter turnout, Huber proposes a strengthening of 
the political parties at the Union level to further develop the legitimising powers 
of the EP.2 
The OSCE/ODIHR report describes the 2009 elections to be “essentially 27 
separate national elections to a supra-national body … characterised by a consid-
erable diversity of national rules, procedures, and practices”.3 The report predicts 
that “the debate about the EP’s electoral framework is likely to continue during 
the next legislature”. Indeed, the EP is determined to deal with the issue. Its 
Committee on Constitutional Affairs has appointed Andrew Duff (MEP) as rap-
porteur on this initiative. An explanatory statement was issued in April 2010,4 
and a draft report in July 2010.5 
The elections to the EP are regulated in the 1976 Elections Act, as amended in 
2002. Duff reviews its history to date.6 We quote the consolidated version ap-
pended as Annex II to the draft report, and refer to it as the “EA”.7 The 
OSCE/ODIHR and Duff reports offer a great many suggestions for the amend-
ment of the EA.  
This paper, however, specifically aims at raising the level of uniformity among 
the 27 national electoral provisions, leaving aside the problem of how the 751 
seats are allocated to the 27 Member States. Section II seconds Duff in his plea to 
set up a European Electoral Authority.8 In Section III we suggest to give the 
European parties a functional role in the elections. As proposed by Schleicher, 
ballot sheets should show the names of the European parties and the electoral 
threshold should refer to how European parties perform at Union level.9  
 
2  Huber, P.M.: Demokratische Legitimation in der Europäischen Union, in: ZSE, 7 (2009), 364–380. 
3  OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Elections to the European Parliament 4–7 
June 2009, Expert Group Report, Warsaw, 22 September 2009. 
4  Duff, A.: Explanatory statement (20.04.2010). Proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the 
election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, 
European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 2010. 
5  Duff, A.: Draft report (05.07.2010) on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning the election of 
the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, European 
Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 2010. 
6  Duff, A., Explanatory statement, op. cit.  
7  Duff, A., Draft report, op. cit.  
8 Duff, A., Explanatory statement, op. cit. 
9 Schleicher, D.: What if Europe held an election and no one cared?, in: Harvard International Law 
Journal, 52 (2011), 109–161. 
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Section IV distinguishes between the establishment of multiple constituencies, 
and the subdivision of an electoral area into several districts. The terms constitu-
ency and district are interpreted in the distinct sense of Oelbermann/Paloma-
res/Pukelsheim, henceforth referred to as OPP.10 Section V sets the stage to 
advance the uniformity level of the electoral procedures. We replace the (non-
visible) European parties by the (visible) Political Groups in the EP. For the 
translation of vote counts into seat numbers we solely employ the divisor method 
with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Laguë). With these prerequisites, Sec-
tion VI presents a prototype evaluation of the 2009 EP elections. 
Sections VII and VIII address two specific proposals from Duff, the introduction 
of a semi-open list system, and the creation of a single European constituency.11 
In the light of our prototype evaluation of the 2009 elections we conclude that 
both proposals call for further specification before their prospective merits can 
be assessed. Section IX points out that the biproportional variant of the divisor 
method with standard rounding would conform particularly well with the consti-
tutional character of the European Union. Section X enumerates ten steps which, 
in the light of this article, seem to be called for to move the EA in the direction 
of more uniformity. 
Article 223 TFEU calls upon the EP to draw up a proposal for the election of its 
Members in accordance with “a uniform procedure” or in accordance with “prin-
ciples common to all Member States”. The ten steps do not suffice to define “a 
uniform procedure” in the singular. They aim to increase the degree of uniform-
ity among the plurality of procedures used by the Member States, and to carry 
the “principles common to all Member States” to a level enabling a unionwide 
view of future EP elections. 
II.  European Electoral Authority 
The biggest obstacle to progress is ignorance. When compiling the 2009 EP 
elections overview in OPP, we found that the national provisions governing the 
elections in the Member States are widely dispersed and hard to get hold of. 
Authoritative facts on the elections are not even available on the EP websites. 
The information offered is incomplete, nor is it evident whether it is truly reli-
 
10  Oelbermann, K.-F./Palomares, A./Pukelsheim, F.: The 2009 European Parliament elections: From votes 
to seats in 27 ways, Evropská volební studia—European Electoral Studies, 5 (2010), 148–182. 
11  Duff, A., Draft report, op. cit. 
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able. We get the impression that Parliament itself lacks a firm knowledge of how 
it is elected, and how seats are allocated. After all, the European Union admits 
23 official languages and operates with three alphabets, Latin, Greek, and Cyril-
lic. Some Member States make their national provisions accessible in their 
mother tongues only. Others provide unofficial translations into English, occa-
sionally with an irritating lack of proficiency when it comes to describing the 
calculations of converting votes into seats. The OSCE/ODIHR report is flawed 
by factual errors, as is the survey of the national electoral provisions provided by 
Lehmann,
12 and the annex on current electoral practices in Member States in 
Duff.
13 In all likelihood, so is the overview in OPP. 
In Duff’s list of amendments, a prominent item is the creation of a European 
Electoral Authority.14 We suggest that such an office should also serve as a cen-
ter for documentation. The EP will soon lose its memory on how it was elected 
in previous legislative periods unless legal acts are archived in a central office. 
Member States ought to be obliged to deposit their electoral provisions with the 
Electoral Authority. As it is equally laborious and challenging to locate final vote 
counts, Member States should also be obliged to deposit their final vote counts 
with the Electoral Authority. 
III. European Party System 
Another obstacle for a move towards more uniformity is the lack of visibility of 
the European party system. This is not to say that European parties do not exist. 
In 2009 nine of them cashed in more than ten million euros from the Union’s 
general budget.15 However, European parties seem to function like astronomical 
black holes. They absorb the money without emanating any political messages. 
In order to enhance their visibility, Schleicher puts forward two proposals:16 to 
print the names of the European parties visibly on ballot sheets and to introduce a 
threshold directly aiming at their electoral performance. Before discussing this in 
greater detail, however, we need to be more explicit on what we mean by the 
term European party. 
 
12  Duff, A., Explanatory statement, op. cit. 
13  Lehmann, W.: The European elections: EU legislation, national provisions and civic participation, 
European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Policy Department C, Brussels, 2009. 
14  Duff, A., Draft report, op. cit. 
15  Cf. Party Subventions for 2009, www.europarl.europa.eu. 
16  Schleicher, D., op. cit. 
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There already exists a precise definition of the term political parties at European 
level.
17 In essence, for a party to qualify accordingly, it must already be firmly 
established in the EP or in national or regional parliaments of at least one quarter 
of the Member States. This requirement may be too restrictive for newcomers to 
join upcoming EP elections. Therefore, we widen the meaning of European 
parties to include, in addition, political organisations at European level that ob-
serve the principles on which the European Union is founded and that campaign 
in the prospective EP elections in at least a quarter of the Member States. Euro-
pean parties, in the wide sense, can be expected to contribute to shaping Euro-
pean awareness and to express the will of citizens of the Union, as demanded by 
Article 10 IV TEU. With this wider meaning of European parties in mind, we 
return to the discussion of the Schleicher plan.  
Firstly, European parties should be given a place on the ballot sheets. Current 
ballot design is such that domestic parties are listed without indicating any af-
filiation with a European party. The Schleicher plan assumes that a domestic 
party seeks membership with a European party and that the affiliation is promi-
nently exhibited on the ballot sheets by printing the emblem and the name of the 
European party ahead of the name of the domestic party. This would provide at 
least some clue for voters to see a European perspective when casting their votes. 
It would be a step in the direction of overcoming the current situation where the 
information on the ballot sheets is restricted to the domestic sphere. 
Secondly, the Schleicher plan proposes an electoral threshold at the level of 
European parties, by requiring them to attract at least three percent of valid votes 
in each of at least a quarter of Member States. For the sake of brevity we refer to 
this stipulation as the 3-in-7 threshold. When a European party passes the 3-in-7 
threshold, all votes cast for the party anywhere in the 27 Member States become 
effective and enter into the seat apportionment calculations. A European party 
passing the 3-in-7 threshold automatically qualifies as a political party at Euro-
pean level according to the Union’s regulation. 
Schleicher accepts further thresholds in national electoral provisions, in addition 
to the 3-in-7 threshold. We feel that multiple layers of thresholds are too confus-
ing. After all, in 2009 the handling of thresholds turned out to be quite diverse, 
cf. OPP. A single 3-in-7 threshold would cut back on this creative threshold 
 
17  Official Journal of the European Union, L 297 (15.11.2003), 1–4, 2. 
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diversity. We would rather bar additional domestic thresholds and make do with 
the 3-in-7 threshold. 
IV. Electoral Regions, Areas, Constituencies, and Districts 
In electoral systems, the terms region, area, constituency, and district are not 
standardised. For EP elections we define their meanings as follows: the electoral 
region comprises all of the European Union. Since the organisation and the 
evaluation of the elections are particular to each Member State, we take a Mem-
ber State to function as an electoral area. According to Article 2 EA it is up to 
each Member State whether to establish multiple constituencies or whether to 
subdivide its electoral area in a different manner.  
We give the establishment of constituencies the following meaning: in the pres-
ence of constituencies, the seat contingent of a Member State is apportioned 
among constituencies prior to the election as stipulated in the national electoral 
provisions. Constituencies are established in the United Kingdom (12 constitu-
encies), Ireland (4), France (8), and Belgium (3). For instance, in Belgium the 
three constituencies are formed by the French, Dutch, and German-speaking 
parts of the country. The establishment of constituencies is a bottom-up ap-
proach, in that the geographical entities are joined to form the electoral area. 
The subdivision into districts appears as a top-down approach. Districts, too, are 
subareas, but the electoral system handles them differently. Firstly, every party is 
allocated a statewide seat number in proportion to its statewide vote counts. 
Secondly, for each party a subapportionment calculation is carried out allocating 
the party’s statewide seats among its district lists, again in proportion to vote 
counts. Three Member States make use of a subdivision into districts, Germany 
(16 districts), Italy (5), and Poland (13). 
The number of seats available in a constituency is called the constituency magni-
tude. The number of seats allocated to a district is called the district magnitude. 
The two concepts differ in that constituency magnitudes are prespecified ex ante, 
while district magnitudes emerge ex post. 
Our distinction between the establishment of multiple constituencies and the 
subdivision into several districts is not generally shared in the literature. Article 2 
EA reads as follows:  
In accordance with its specific national situation, each Member State may establish 
constituencies for elections to the EP or subdivide its electoral area in a different 
manner, without generally affecting the proportional nature of the voting system. 
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Duff breaks Article 2 into three clauses that merely refer to the term ‘constituen-
cies’ and omit any reference to a subdivision in a different manner:18 
1. Each Member State may establish constituencies for elections to the EP on a terri-
torial basis. 
2. States with a population of at least twenty million shall subdivide their electoral 
area into a number of regional constituencies. 
3. The establishment of constituencies must not generally affect the proportional na-
ture of the voting system. 
There is no indication as to whether the focus on the establishment of constituen-
cies and the omission of a subdivision in a different manner are intentional. Is it 
meant to restrict the margin of discretion which Member States enjoy under the 
auspices of the common principles of the EA? The second phrase forces the 
seven largest Member States to subdivide their electoral area into constituencies. 
While Germany is composed of federal states, its Grundgesetz embodies a rather 
unitary character. It would seem to us that the second phrase forces Germany to 
rewrite its Basic Law. In Member States such as Spain, the establishment of 
constituencies might constitute a Herculean task.  
The third phrase sounds innocuous, but may give rise to intriguing questions. We 
illustrate its consequences by referring to the Member States that in 2009 made 
use of the establishment of constituencies (Belgium, France, Ireland, and United 
Kingdom). In Belgium, the Deutschsprachiges Wahlkollegium constituency has a 
single seat available for apportionment. As one seat is not enough to achieve any 
proportionality whatsoever, the third phrase is violated. Evidently, the constitu-
ency is established for reasons of minority representation. However, exceptions 
in favor of minority representation are not included in Duff’s amendment. In 
France, the Outre-Mer constituency commands just three seats. In this case, it is 
not minority representation that is decisive, but the particularities of the territo-
rial structure of the constituency. 
The other constituencies are void of minority considerations or geographical 
peculiarities. Nevertheless, the French Massive Central/Centre constituency 
commands only five seats, all Irish constituencies and the British North-East 
constituency are allocated a mere three seats. Not much proportionality can be 
achieved with such a small number of seats, raising the question why voters in 
these constituencies are deprived of their right to proportional representation. 
 
18  Duff, A., Draft report, op. cit. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/1610-7780-2011-1-9
Generiert durch Universität Augsburg, am 06.05.2019, 10:08:06.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
ABHANDLUNGEN / ANALYSES  
16 
As for the EP’s composition, we can observe a lively debate in Parliament on the 
rule that Member States must be allocated at least six seats in order to represent 
the diversity of their political spectrum. When Member States make use of their 
margin of discretion, they draft constituencies sufficiently small that there is no 
hope of representing the political spectrum. We propose to rephrase the amend-
ment in a more confirmatory manner: 3. The establishment of constituencies must 
be such that there are at least six seats available for proportional representation, 
unless sufficient reason justifies a smaller constituency magnitude.  
Even a constituency magnitude of six seats entails severe limitations on the at-
tainable level of proportional representation. The problem lies in the range of 
vote shares needed to obtain representation in Parliament. This range begins with 
the threshold of representation and ends with the threshold of exclusion.19 Below 
the threshold of representation, it is impossible for a party to win a seat. Above 
the threshold of exclusion, a party is guaranteed a seat. Between these two 
thresholds, the likelihood of winning a seat varies depending on how the other 
parties perform. With only a few seats available, the effective threshold is set far 
above five percent of the valid votes. 
In the following, we rely on the divisor method with standard rounding (Web-
ster/Sainte-Laguë). For this method, with six seats available and four parties 
campaigning, the threshold of representation amounts to 1/14 = 7 percent, while 
the threshold of exclusion is 1/10 = 10 percent. Hence, with a vote share below 
seven percent, representation is plainly impossible. A party needs at least ten 
percent voter support to be certain to gain a seat. A threshold of ten percent de-
fies the current five percent threshold in Article 3 EA. Moreover, it is viewed 
rather critically by the European Court of Human Rights.20 
With a constituency magnitude of twelve seats and six parties campaigning, the 
threshold of representation falls to 1/28 = 4 percent. The threshold of exclusion 
amounts to 1/20 = 5 percent. In 2009 all Member States, except the six smallest, 
had twelve or more seats at their disposal. These Member States should be in-
vited to establish constituencies with magnitude twelve or more, so that the 
threshold of exclusion does not become overly large.  
 
19  Gallagher, M./Mitchell, P.: The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford, 2008, 607. 
20  European Court of Human Rights, Yumak and Sadak versus Turkey, No. 10226/03, Judgment by the 
Grand Chamber of 8 July 2008.  
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submits three lists of candidates to the Slovak electorate. There are more in-
stances where two or more domestic parties merge their MEPs into the same 
Political Group. In most countries, proportional representation systems do not 
admit parties to campaign with two or more lists because this would secure an 
undue advantage over their competitors. The EA should demand that domestic 
parties belonging to the same European party submit a single, joint list within 
each constituency and within each district. 
Secondly, the 2009 elections feature another complication. Two or more parties 
registered an alliance (also known as list apparentement), yet the MEPs so 
elected join different Political Groups. For instance, in Denmark, Alliance 1 
consists of three parties. The four MEPs of the first party join S&D, the two 
MEPs of the second party go along with Greens/EFA, and the third party sends 
no MEP into the EP. So what does it mean when a citizen casts a vote for a part-
ner of Alliance 1? Is the vote going to help the party of the voter’s choice to win 
a seat, or another partner of the alliance, or does it fail to account for a seat? This 
disorientation deprives voters of their right to a direct election. We therefore 
chose to exclude party alliances from EP elections. In fact, party alliances be-
come superfluous as soon as a size-neutral seat apportionment method is 
adopted. 
Democratic representation usually builds on the principle of equal elections, as 
captured by the motto one person, one vote. In handling this principle, the Euro-
pean Union proves to be a political body sui generis, torn between degressivity, 
progressivity, and proportionality. Degressive representation prevails for the 
composition of the EP, the allocation of the 751 seats to the 27 Member States. 
Degressivity means that a human being’s electoral weight decreases when seen 
as a citizen of larger Member States and increases for citizens of smaller Mem-
ber States. On the other hand, progressive representation is based on viewing the 
same individuals as voters of political parties. Progressivity thus means that a 
human being’s electoral weight increases for citizens who vote for larger parties 
and decreases for voters of smaller parties. The seat apportionment method mani-
festly serving progressivity is the divisor method with rounding down (Jeffer-
son/D’Hondt/Hagenbach-Bischoff), employed in 16 of the 27 Member States in 
2009. We believe that degressive representation and progressive representation 
contradict the principle of proportional representation. 
The seat apportionment method harmonising most convincingly with the one 
person, one vote principle is indeed the divisor method with standard rounding 
(Webster/Sainte-Laguë). This is the central message of the seminal monograph 
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of Balinski/Young, who corroborate their findings with a plethora of arguments.22 
In particular, the method is neutral towards electoral success. Whether larger or 
smaller in terms of vote counts, every party gets on average as many seats as it 
deserves on the grounds of the theoretical Rule of Three. There is absolutely no 
incentive for parties to manipulate the system by registering as alliances. 
Furthermore, the divisor method with standard rounding is based on the most 
transparent calculations. Each vote count is divided by a common divisor and the 
resulting quotient is rounded to the nearest whole number, which then constitutes 
the seat contingent. The divisor plays the role of an electoral key specifying the 
number of voters accounting for “about” one seat (that is, before rounding). 
VI. Prototype Evaluation of the 2009 EP Elections 
The unified evaluation of the 2009 EP elections revolves around Table 2 and is 
complemented by Tables 3 and 4. The essential items are the pairs of numbers in 
two adjacent columns (Table 2) or separated by a hyphen (Tables 3 and 4). On 
the left-hand side, we print the vote counts of a Political Group and on to the 
right the seat numbers hypothetically apportioned to the Group by the divisor 
method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Laguë). 
Table 2 calls for a series of comments. Member States are sorted by population 
figures from large to small. The reverse ordering from small to large would be 
equally informative. The OSCE/ODIHR report lists Member States in protocol 
order. This injects a considerable amount of randomness and disguises the effects 
of size. The two-letter code of a Member State is followed by a slash (/) when 
the State subdivides its electoral area into several districts (Germany, Italy, Po-
land). A star (*) indicates that the State establishes multiple constituencies 
(France, United Kingdom, Belgium, Ireland). Population figures are taken from 
the Official Journal, which publishes these figures for qualified majorities in the 
Union’s Council of Ministers.23 Since the rationale for referring the Council of 
Ministers’ qualified majority decisions to population is concurrent with the ra-
tionale for basing representation in the EP on the Union’s citizens, we believe 
that in both cases the same figures should be used. Strangely, the Official Journal 
rounds population figures into multiples of centuries of a hundred citizens and 
 
22  Balinski, M./Young, H.P.: Fair Representation – Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote, Second 
Edition, Washington DC, 2001. 
23  Official Journal of the European Union, L 325 (11.12.2009), 55–56. 
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prints them as decimal fractions of legions of a thousand citizens. Since Eurostat 
takes pains not to round whole citizens into numerical fractions, we prefer the 
authentic Eurostat input to the manipulated Official Journal output. The “Seats” 
column lists the seat contingents in force for the 2009 elections to allocate the 
736 seats among the 27 Member States. 
The Political Groups’ vote counts are aggregated from OPP. All party alliances 
are included. Non-attached parties and non-attached independent candidates not 
winning a seat are dismissed. In Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, the United King-
dom, and Latvia, some domestic parties are represented by MEPs who joined 
different Political Groups. In these cases, we redistributed votes in proportion to 
how many MEPs joined which Group. In Luxembourg, voters can mark up to six 
votes on their ballots. During the 2009 elections, the average number of marks 
per ballot was A = 1 121 305 / 198 364 ≈ 5.7. Therefore, we divide the vote 
counts from Luxembourg by A and round the results to the nearest whole num-
ber. In this way, we obtain pseudo vote counts referring to individuals, not to 
ballot sheet marks. In Ireland, Malta, and the Northern Ireland constituency of 
the United Kingdom, where single transferable vote systems are used, only first 
preferences are entered in Table 2. The last column quotes state divisors belong-
ing to the divisor method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Laguë). For 
each Member State, the divisor signifies the number of voters justifying about 
one seat. If degressive proportionality were a concept of intrinsic value, divisors 
would be decreasing so that fewer voters suffice to account for about one seat as 
Member States become smaller. This is not the case. Due to varying voter turn-
outs, divisors jump back and forth, only roughly in line with population figures.  
The overall conclusion is rather encouraging. The hypothetically calculated seat 
numbers in Table 2 most often coincide with the actually apportioned seat num-
bers in OPP or deviate by no more than one seat. 
There are two exceptions, France and the United Kingdom. Both states establish 
several constituencies and then allocate seats by applying the divisor method 
with rounding down (Jefferson/D’Hondt/Hagenbach-Bischoff). The method is 
notorious for being biased, each application promising some bonus seat shares 
for larger parties at the expense of losses of smaller parties. When repeated often 
enough, bonus seats (and malus seats) materialise with near certainty. In fact, the 
largest party carries away a bonus of four seats both cases. This provides some 
confirmation for our decision to only use the divisor method with standard 
rounding (Webster/Sainte-Laguë). The latter method is neutral to size and im-
mune against any biasing effects from establishing multiple constituencies. 
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Germany, Italy, and Poland subdivide their electoral areas into several districts. 
The statewide seats of a Political Group from Table 2 need to be subapportioned 
among districts. As an illustration, the top part of Table 4 exhibits the calcula-
tions for Italy. Italy constitutes a particular challenge to the advancement of the 
EA. The challenge arises not only from a quantitative, procedural analysis, but 
also from the normative, judicial viewpoint. The Italian electoral provisions are 
self-contradictory. Is this solely an Italian issue? Could non-Italian Union citi-
zens who vote in Italy feel impaired in their electoral rights and go to court? To 
which court? 
The seat apportionment method used in Italy is a variant of the Hare quota 
method with residual fit by greatest remainders. With this method, district mag-
nitudes in the 2009 EP election come out to be 21, 15, 15, 15, and 6, see OPP. 
However, Article 2 of the Italian electoral provisions pre-specifies the magni-
tudes in proportion to population.24 The law stipulates the district magnitudes to 
be 19, 13, 14, 18, and 8. None of the districts is allocated the number of seats 
legally specified in Article 2. The pre-specification of the district magnitudes is 
at odds with the instructions on how votes get translated into seats. Pennisi/ 
Ricca/Simeone criticise the bachi e buchi in the Italian electoral systems, to no 
avail.25 The bug persists. A solution to the problem is the biproportional appor-
tionment method used in the Swiss Cantons of Zurich, Schaffhausen, and Aar-
gau.26 Its application to the Italian data is displayed in the bottom part of Table 3.  
 
24  Legge 24 gennaio 1979, n. 18—Elezione dei membri del Parlamento Europeo spettanti all'Italia 
(G.U. 30 gennaio 1979 n. 29), executed through Decreto del 1o aprile 2009 (G.U. Serie generale 3 aprile 
2009 n. 78). 
25  Pennisi, A./Ricca, F./Simeone, B.: Bachi e buchi della legge elettorale italiana nell'allocazione bipro-
porzionale di seggi, Sociologia e ricerca sociale, 79 (2006), 55–76; Pennisi, A./Ricca, F./Simeone, B.: 
Una legge elettorale sistematicamente erronea, Polena: Political and Electoral Navigations—Rivista Ital-
iana di Analisi Elettorale, 6 (2009), 65–72.  
26  Pukelsheim, F./Schuhmacher, C.: Das neue Zürcher Zuteilungsverfahren für Parlamentswahlen, Ak-
tuelle Juristische Praxis—Pratique Juridique Actuelle, 5 (2004), 505–522; Balinski, M./Pukelsheim, F.: 
Matrices and politics, in: Liski, E./Isotalo, J./Puntanen, S./Styan, G.P.H. (ed.), Festschrift for Tarmo 
Pukkila on his 60th Birthday, Tampere, 2006, 233–242. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/1610-7780-2011-1-9
Generiert durch Universität Augsburg, am 06.05.2019, 10:08:06.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.

































































































































































roups, using the divisor m
ethod w








roup's vote count is divided by the S













roups, using the divisor m
ethod w








roup's vote count is divided by the S




Generiert durch Universität Augsburg, am 06.05.2019, 10:08:06.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
Kai-Friederike Oelbermann / Friedrich Pukelsheim Future European Parliament Elections 












































Kai-Friederike Oelbermann / Friedrich Pukelsheim Future European Parliament Elections 
















































































































































































































































































































































































Generiert durch Universität Augsburg, am 06.05.2019, 10:08:06.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
ABHANDLUNGEN / ANALYSES  
24 
Furthermore, the biproportional solution provides a tool to fit France, United 
Kingdom, and Belgium into the hypothetical uniform evaluation in Table 2. 
Table 4 exemplifies the calculations for Belgium, the top part showing the novel 
joint biproportional evaluation, the bottom part current separate per-constituency 
evaluations. For the biproportional application, the vote count for a Political 
Group in a constituency is divided by two divisors, the constituency divisor and 
the group divisor. The resulting quotient is rounded to the nearest whole number. 
Constituency magnitudes and statewide Group seat numbers are met precisely. 
As before, the seat numbers obtained deviate from the actual allocation by at 
most a single seat transfer. France and the United Kingdom would call for simi-
lar tables. Since the biproportional evaluation meets the Groups’ statewide seat 
numbers, the threshold of exclusion that becomes relevant originates from the 
Member State’s seat contingent, not from constituency magnitudes. Small mag-
nitudes no longer entail high thresholds of exclusion. 
VII. Semi-open List Systems? 
Duff, in drawing conclusions, proposes “the compulsory use of the preferential 
semi-open list system” as if there were only one such system.27 Without describ-
ing in detail which semi-open list system he proposes, any discussion of its pro-
spective merits remains speculative. The proposed introduction of a semi-open 
list system correlates with the proposition that Member States with a population 
of at least 20 million shall establish multiple constituencies. Presumably, ballot 
sheets are otherwise feared to reach poster size and become too unwieldy for 
voters to handle their semi-open choice efficiently. 
In any case, if the EP desires to cap the size of constituencies, population figures 
are an inappropriate index to use. After all, the EP assigns degressive weights to 
batches of 20 million citizens consisting of Romanians, Poles, Spaniards, Ital-
ians, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans. The index to refer to is constitu-
ency magnitude. Parliament may decree a largest constituency magnitude of 25 
seats or the like, in addition to a smallest constituency magnitude of six seats. 
 
27  Duff, A., Explanatory statement, op. cit. 
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VIII. A Unionwide Constituency for 25 Additional MEPs? 
Duff proposes to elect 25 additional MEPs from a single constituency formed by 
the entire Union territory, using semi-open lists.28 The goal is to enhance the 
European dimension of EP elections and to increase the representative capability 
of the EP. We wonder how the proposal would work out.  
Assuming that prospective second votes for the unionwide lists run more or less 
in parallel to the (first) votes shown in Table 2, every batch of 5 600 000 votes 
accounts for about one of the 25 seats. The EPP would be awarded nine seats, 
S&D seven, ALDE three, Greens/EFA two, and ECR, EFD, GUE/NGL and NA 
one each. Contemplating the EPP column of Table 2, the nine EPP seats go to 
Italy, Germany, Spain, France, Poland, Romania, Greece, Hungary, and Portugal. 
The allocation of the unionwide seats of the other Political Groups is similarly 
predictable. Altogether not much of an election is going on. Rather, 25 reliably 
safe EP tickets are dealt out among the larger Member States. 
Duff remains silent on the origin of the additional 25 seats.29 If “additional” is 
taken literally, they are created in addition to the prospective 751 seats. The 
creation must appear a sheer nightmare to all believers in degressivity, since all 
of these seats will go to the larger Member States. Alternatively, the “additional” 
seats may be subtracted from the 751 total and diminish the contingents of the 
Member States of the successful candidates. In essence, the larger Member 
States would have to upgrade seats from the domestic to the Union level al-
though they already face a reduced contingent due to degressivity. 
Another imbalance may require attention: the twelve million EPP voters in Italy 
would be strong enough to carry two EP seats. A first option is to place two 
Italian candidates on the EPP list. We doubt whether the EPP partners would 
tolerate this much progressivity in favor of Italy. A second option would be an 
aggressive campaign by the Italian EPP branch on behalf of, for example, the 
Lithuanian candidate, so that sufficiently many Italian EPP voters use the semi-
open lists to vote the Lithuanian candidate into Parliament, in addition to the one 
Italian candidate.  
Thus, the idea of a unionwide constituency for the election of 25 additional 
MEPs would seem to require further contemplation.  
 
28  Duff, A., Draft report, op. cit. 
29  Ibid. 
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IX. Uniformity via Biproportionality? 
Advances in EP electoral matters hinge on the functioning of a European party 
system. Only when German voters of Angela Merkel’s Christlich Demokratische 
Union acknowledge that their votes may be instrumental for a candidate of Silvio 
Berlusconi’s Popolo della Libertà to win an EP seat can we safely aggregate 
votes on the Union level and evaluate them unionwide. Rather than limiting 
ourselves to the unionwide election of an extra 25 MEPs, we could allocate all 
751 seats in a unionwide calculation. The biproportional parts of Tables 3 and 4 
point the way how to respect Member States’ seat contingents and parties’ un-
ionwide seat numbers simultaneously. From the computational viewpoint, 
27 Member States and eight Political Groups are handled in the same fashion as 
are five districts and four Political Groups in Italy or three constituencies and six 
Political Groups in Belgium. Currently, however, acceptance of vote aggregation 
on the Union level remains Zukunftsmusik. 
X. Conclusion 
In the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission,30 all 27 Member States confirm 
Europe’s electoral heritage of conducting parliamentary elections by direct uni-
versal suffrage in a free, equal and secret ballot. Moreover, the Union intends to 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms.31 Paying due attention to the principle of electoral 
equality would help rectifying misunderstandings concerning the EP’s democ-
ratic legitimisation as voiced in the Lisbon decision of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court. 
All elections entail the counting of votes. The final vote counting processes for 
the EP elections require synchronisation. With current election days ranging 
from Thursday to Sunday, a compromise median day appears to be a Saturday. 
At present, Saturday is a voting day in just five Member States: Italy, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, and Malta.32 
 
30  Council of Europe, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Code of 
good practice in electoral matters—Guidelines and explanatory report, Opinion no. 190/2002, CDL-AD 
(2002) 23 rev. 
31  Article 6 II TEU, Official Journal of the European Union, C 83 (30.3.2010), 13–45, 19. 
32 Duff, A., Explanatory statement, op. cit. 
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When polling stations in Greece are kept open from 9 to 18 local time, in Italy 
from 8 through 17, and in Portugal from 7 to 16, they close at the same point in 
time. Vote counting would take place simultaneously on Saturday evening. Na-
tional electoral offices might process the data on Sunday morning. The European 
Electoral Authority could issue preliminary final results Sunday afternoon, in 
time for the Monday newspapers. 
In conclusion, we hold that the following ten steps would be helpful to move in 
the direction of more uniform procedures for EP elections. 
1. A European Electoral Authority is created. Member States are invited to 
deposit their national electoral provisions and final electoral results with the 
Authority. 
2. Ballot sheets must exhibit emblems and names of European parties ahead of 
affiliated domestic parties. 
3. Domestic parties that belong to the same European party submit a joint list 
of candidates. 
4. Alliances of European parties (also known as list apparentements) are not 
allowed. 
5. Votes become effective (enter into the seat apportionment calculations) only 
(a) if cast for a European party attracting at least three percent of valid votes 
in each of at least a quarter of Member States, or (b) if cast for a domestic 
party that the Member State recognises as a minority representation party, or 
(c) if cast for an independent candidate who passes the threshold for inde-
pendent candidates as stipulated by the Member States’ national provisions. 
6. Every Member State may establish multiple constituencies or subdivide its 
electoral area into several districts. 
7. Each constituency must be large enough to provide for at least six seats, 
unless sufficient reason justifies a smaller constituency magnitude. 
8. For list systems, the translation of votes into seats is based on the divisor 
method with standard rounding (Webster/Sainte-Laguë) or its biproportional 
variant. 
9. The EP is elected by direct universal suffrage in a free, equal and secret 
ballot, as guaranteed in Articles 9 and 14 III TEU. Degressive proportional-
ity is relegated to issues concerning the composition of the EP as in Article 
14 II TEU. 
10. Election day is a Saturday in May. Polling stations close at 16:00 GMT. 
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There is a long-lasting lamento that the EP elections are second-order elections, 
ever since Reif/Schmitt coined the phrase.33 The above ten steps are proposed 
with the intention of providing a procedural frame for the EP elections to raise to 
first-order. The ten steps, or the amendments of Duff,34 or the changes suggested 
by Hix/Hagemann,35 or a mixture thereof, may help to strengthen the legitimi-
sing powers of the EP, to improve the connection between the MEPs and their 
electorates, and to raise voter turnout above the 2009 all-time low.  
 
33  Reif, K./Schmitt, H.: Nine second-order national elections—A conceptual framework for the analysis of 
European election results, European Journal of Political Research, 8 (1980), 3–44.  
34 Duff, A., Explanatory statement, op. cit. 
35  Hix, S./Hagemann, S.: Could changing the electoral rules fix European Parliament elections?, Politique 
européenne, 28 (2009), 27–41. 
https://doi.org/10.5771/1610-7780-2011-1-9
Generiert durch Universität Augsburg, am 06.05.2019, 10:08:06.
Das Erstellen und Weitergeben von Kopien dieses PDFs ist nicht zulässig.
